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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of military expenditures on income inequality in Pakistan 
using data over the period of 1972-2012. In doing so, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing 
cointegration approach which confirmed the presence of long run relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality. Furthermore, empirical analysis indicates that military 
expenditures have positive impact on income inequality. The analysis of Granger causality, Toda 
and Yamamoto Modified Wald causality and variance decomposition approaches confirm the 
unidirectional causal relationship running from military expenditures to income inequality. The 
findings suggest that military expenditures would be a significant policy option to control 
income inequality and should be considered as a mean to improve income distribution in 
Pakistan. 
Keywords: Military Expenditures, Income Inequality, Economic Growth  
JEL Classification: H56, D30, F43 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In last two decades the increasing inequalities within and between countries due to high 
expenditures on military budgets across the world are the two serious issues among the 
researchers and economists. However, there are very few studies analyzed the relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality which provide conflicting empirical 
findings. Researchers and economist have analyzed the consequences of high military 
expenditures on economic development of any country. The first influential study was conducted 
by Benoit (1973) who analyzed the relationship between military expenditures
1
 and economic 
growth. Benoit (1973) in this study confirmed the positive association between military 
expenditures and economic growth. The positive effect of military expenditures on economic 
growth has been confirmed by many other researchers.
2
 On the other hand, some researchers also 
found the negative association between military expenditures and economic growth.
3
   
 
One of the major objectives of any welfare state is to redistribute the government revenues to 
public for improving the distribution of wealth. Government has to perform different social 
expenditures to improve the living standard and reduce the income inequality within the country. 
The size of the budget is the main hurdle in the way of government to distribute the government 
revenue for social activities. The size of budget plays a conflicting role to make trade-offs 
between different types of expenditures. Therefore, higher military expenditures results in the 
less fund available for education, health, welfare and other social expenditures which all 
contribute to improve income inequality (Gunluk-Senesen, 2002; Shahbaz, 2010, Elveren, 2012). 
Indeed, there are some studies which suggest the conflicting evidence on the trade-offs between 
social expenditures and military expenditures (Yildirim and Sezgin, 2002). It can be argued that 
                                                        
1
 We use military expenditure and defence expenditure interchangeably throughout the paper. 
2
 Federicksen and Looney (1982), Weede (1986), Stewart (1991), Ward et al. (1991), Mueller and Atesoglu (1993), 
Murdoch et al. (1997), Sheih et al. (2002), Yildirim et al. (2005), Narayan and Singh (2007), Wijeweera and Webb 
(2011) and Tiwari and Shahbaz (2012)  
3
Grobar and Porter (1989), Alexander (1990), Chowdhury (1991), Madden and Haslehurst (1995), Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995), Lai et al. (2002), Gerace (2002) and Wilkins (2004), Shahbaz and Shabbir (2012), Shahbaz et al. 
(2013a) etc. 
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the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality varies between country to 
country and region to region. However, the elasticity and relationship between these two depends 
upon the historical, cultural, economic, political and institutional structure of the country. 
 
1.1. Military Expenditures and Income Inequality in Pakistan 
The military expenditures always have a high proportion in Pakistani budget due to high 
conflicts with India. There has been a steady increase in military expenditures of Pakistan since 
its independence in 1947. Table-1 shows the trends of military expenditures in Pakistan. In 
1970‟s the average annual military expenditures was 10.17 billion rupees. These annual military 
expenditures were continuously increased in 1980‟s, 1990‟s and 2000‟s to 30.48, 100.48 and 
222.27 billion rupees respectively. In last four years, military expenditures also showing rapid 
increasing trend from 2009 to 2012 of annual military expenditures of 311.30, 378.14, 450.62 
and 507.16 billion rupees respectively. 
 
Table -1: Trend of Military Expenditure and Income Inequality in Pakistan 
Time Period Military Expenditure* Income Inequality 
1970s 10.17 0.359 
1980s 30.48 0.364 
1990s 100.48 0.403 
2000s 222.77 0.300 
2009 311.30 0.321 
2010 378.14 0.328 
2011 450.62 0.332 
2012 507.16 0.345 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Pakistan  
* indicates Billion Pakistani Rupees 
 
There are several reasons that explain the high level of military expenditures in Pakistan. First of 
all, in Pakistan there has been implicit military intervention in the government, five military 
coups has had direct intervention in Pakistan and ruled for 32 years of total 66 years of 
independence. It would not be wrong to argue that political leaders in the form of military corps 
have a tendency to devote more resources to military in general. Second, the non-friendly and 
conflicting relationship with India is also the main reasons for higher military expenditures. 
Pakistan has three major wars with India since 1947 in the years of 1965, 1971 and 1999. 
Pakistan has a long border with India and for that reason the large size of military personnel in 
the country is become an essential.  
 
Third, Pakistan is the major partner with USA in fighting against war on terrorism since 2001. 
Pakistan has witnessed tremendous increase in the terrorist and violent incidents of amplified 
intensities since 2004. These attacks were intensive in terms of casualties as well. For instance, 
from 2008 to 2012 the total of 12020 civilians and 3611 armed forces personnel were killed in 
terrorist activities. In only 2013, 3,677 people were killed in terrorist activities on civilian and 
armed forces personnel (Shahbaz et al. 2013b). Table-2 represents the total number of fatalities 
in civilian and armed forces personnel from 2004 to 2014. All these incidents can be the reasons 
of increase in the military expenditures. 
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Table-2: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014 
Year  Civilians 
Security 
Force 
Personnel 
Total 
2003 140 24 164 
2004 435 184 619 
2005 430 81 511 
2006 608 325 933 
2007 1522 597 2119 
2008 2155 654 2809 
2009 2324 991 3315 
2010 1796 469 2265 
2011 2738 765 3503 
2012 3007 732 3739 
2013 3001 676 3677 
2014 58 26 84 
Total* 18214 5524 23738 
Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org) 
* Data till January 12, 2014 
  
 
Pakistan has a highly unequal income distribution compared with the other developing economy. 
The trend of income inequality shows very mix results in Pakistan. Table-2 shows the trends of 
income inequality in Pakistan. In 1970‟s the average annual value of Gini coefficient was 0.359. 
In 1980‟s the income inequality in Pakistan remained very steady and increased by only 0.005, 
the average annual value of Gini coefficient in 1980‟s was 0.364. Furthermore, in 1990‟s the 
income inequality in Pakistan is sharply increased and with an average value of Gini coefficient 
was 0.403. The year of 1992 was having the highest value of Gini coefficient i.e. 0.410. In the 
decade of 2000‟s the position of income inequality in Pakistan has better and the value of Gini 
coefficient is decreased by significantly 25 percent. The average annual value of Gini coefficient 
was 0.300 in 2000‟s. However, the income inequality in Pakistan has been increasing from last 
for years i.e. 2009 to 2012 with a Gini coefficient value of 0.321, 0.328, 0.332 and 0.345 
respectively.  
  
The paper makes a unique contribution to the literature with reference to Pakistan, being a 
pioneering attempt to investigate the impact of military expenditures on income inequality. The 
study uses the annual data for the period of 1972-2012 by applying more rigorous econometric 
techniques. We find that military expenditures add in income inequality. The causality analysis 
reveals that military expenditures Granger cause income inequality.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews some theoretical and selected cross country as well as time series empirical 
studies.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
There is no such theory that discusses the relationship between military expenditures and income 
inequality. The possible mechanisms that show the relationship between military expenditures 
and income inequality are discussed in existing literature. For example, first, according to 
5 
 
Keynesian point of view, high budget allocation on military spending enhances income 
opportunities in defence related sectors which increase the aggregate demand, earnings and 
employment opportunities in these sectors. These availabilities of employment opportunities play 
a critical role in reducing income inequality (Meng et al. 2013). Second, the above mentioned 
channel may be different because, the detail composition of military spending is sometime very 
complex. If the high defence budget is used to create the employment or earning opportunities 
for less skilled labor then income inequality should be reduced. But, if the high defence budget is 
used to create the employment or earning opportunities for high skilled labor then income 
inequality would be increased. The actual effect is dependent on the specific structure and nature 
of military spending (Ali, 2007; Meng et al. 2013). Third, military expenditures are generally 
made at the expense of other public and social expenditures. These heavy expenses on military 
create the scarce resources for other social welfare expenditures and reduced the available 
resources for social and welfare programs. The less investment on social and welfare programs 
leads to increase in income inequality (Lin and Ali, 2009).    
 
Fourth, the spillover of defence R&D and defence technology provides a positive externality. As 
a known, modern military weapons are all based on advanced technologies. These technologies 
are also a key factor for the improvement of industrial productivity. These technological 
advancement may also used in other industries. The development of industries through 
technological development increases the productivity of the entire country. The increase in total 
productivity leads to increase in financial income, which also leads to use these incomes so as to 
reduce the income inequality in the country (Meng et al. 2013).  
 
2.2 Empirical Studies 
There are very few studies which have been done to analyze the relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality. Abell (1994) was the first to analyze the relationship in 
between military expenditures and income inequality in US by using the time series data from 
the period of 1972-1991. The empirical results indicate that military expenditures increase 
income inequality in the US society. Similarly, Seiglie (1997) also explored the US military 
expenditures by using the larger sample from the period of 1939-1989. The empirical results 
show that military expenditures are associated with budget deficit which is a source for income 
transfer among different social groups. Likewise, Ali and Galbraith (2003) also analyzed the 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality by controlling the effects of 
size of armed forces, GDP growth and per capita income. Their results suggest the positive 
association between military expenditures and income inequality. Moreover, Ali (2007) 
determined the global panel data from the period of 1987-1997 and found the positive 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality by controlling the effects of 
some major macroeconomic variables such as per capita income, economic growth and size of 
the armed forces.  
 
Furthermore, Vadlamannati (2008) examined the military expenditures and income inequality in 
four South Asian countries by using the panel data from the period of 1975-2005.
4
 The empirical 
findings show that higher military expenditures lead to higher income inequality after controlling 
the major macroeconomic and institutional variables. In addition, Lin and Ali (2009) also 
verified the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality by using the larger 
                                                        
4
 These countries were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. 
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sample of 58 countries from the period of 1987-1999. Their findings also show the positive 
relationship between income inequality and military expenditures. Another study conducted by 
Hirnissa et al. (2009) who analyze the causal relationship between military expenditures and 
income inequality in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, South Korea and India by 
using the time series data for the period of 1970-2005. They noted that the unidirectional 
causality exists running from military spending to income inequality in Malaysia while 
bidirectional causality is found between both variables for Singapore. There is no causality exists 
between military spending and income inequality in Indonesia, India, Philippines and South 
Korea. Kentor et al. (2012) analyzed the panel data of 82 developed and less developed countries 
to analyze the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality. Their results 
demonstrate the positive relationship between considered variables. Similarly, Elveren (2012) 
investigated the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality in Turkey by 
using the time series data for the period of 1963-2007. The findings validate the presence of 
cointegration between the series. Elveren also notes the unidirectional causal relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality running from military expenditures to 
income inequality. Meng et al. (2013) also analyzed the long run cointegration and causal 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality in China by using data over the 
period of 1989-2012. Their empirical findings confirm that the unidirectional causality is found 
running from military expenditures to income inequality.  
 
There are very rare studies available in existing literature which shows the negative relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality. For example, Comton (2005) claimed the 
negative relationship between military expenditures and income inequality in United States. He 
argued that increase in military expenditures generates more jobs for unskilled workers which 
lead to improve income distribution. Ali (2012) investigated the relationship between military 
spending and income inequality in Middle East and North African (MENA) countries by using 
the panel data over the period of 1987-2005. The results show the nonconventional significant 
negative relationship of military expenditures with income inequality in MENA countries. 
Besides, Shahbaz et al. (2012) also analyzed the cointegration and causal relationship between 
military expenditures and income inequality in Iran by using the time series data from the period 
of 1969-2011. The ARDL bounds testing approach suggests the valid long run relationship. 
Their results confirm the significant negative relationship between military expenditures and 
income inequality and military spending Granger causes income inequality in Iran.  
 
3. Empirical Framework 
After reviewing the theoretical and empirical work, the model to examine the relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality is modeled as given below framework:  
 
             (1) 
 
Where, 
t

 
is the error term, IIQ is the income inequality which is measured by Gini coefficient, 
MEX is the military expenditures as percentage of GDP, GDP is real gross domestic product and 
PCI is real per capita income. The expected signs for GDP and PCI are negative while, the sign 
of MEX is to be determined. In basic model researcher also considered GDP and PCI to control 
the effects of economic growth and income level. The annual time series data over the period of 
ttttt
PCIGDPMEXIIQ  
3210
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1972-2012 is used for empirical analysis. All data are gathered from DataStream and different 
issues of economic surveys of Pakistan.  
 
3.1 Unit Root Test 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip Perron (PP) unit root tests are used to examine the 
stationary properties for long run relationship of time series variables. Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF)
5
 test is based on equation given below: 
 
  (2) 
 
Where  is pure white noise error term,  is first difference operator,  is a time series,  is the 
constant and k is the optimum numbers of lags of the dependent variable. Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test determines whether the estimates of coefficients are equal to zero. ADF test 
provide cumulative distribution of ADF statistics. The variable is said to stationary, if the value 
of the coefficient  is less than critical values from fuller table. Phillip and Perron (PP)
6
 unit root 
test equation is given below: 
  
  (3) 
 
The Phillip and Perron unit root test is also based on t-statistics that is associated with estimated 
coefficients of .  
 
3.2 ARDL Bound Testing Approach 
The Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method of cointegration developed by Pesaran 
and Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin (1999) Pesaran et al. (2000, 2001) has been used with the 
help of unrestricted vector error correction model to investigate the long run relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality. The ARDL bounds testing approach has 
several advantages over other cointegration methods. The ARDL approach may apply 
irrespective of whether underlying variables are purely I(0), I(1) or mutually co-integrated.
7
 The 
bounds testing approach has estimated better small sample properties.
8
 In the ARDL procedure 
the estimations of results is even possible if the explanatory variable are endogenous.
9
 The 
ARDL model is developed for estimations as follow: 
 
 
                                                        
5 See, Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
6 See, Phillips and Perron (1988) 
7
 Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
8
 Haug (2002) 
9
 Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001) 
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Where  is constant and   is white noise error term, the error correction dynamics is denoted 
by summation sign while the second part of the equation corresponds to long run relationship. 
Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) has been used to identify the optimum lag of model and each 
series. In the ARDL model, we first estimate the F-statistic value by using the appropriate ARDL 
models. Secondly, the Wald (F-statistic) test is used to investigate the long run relationship 
among the series. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the calculated F-test 
statistic exceeds the upper critical bound (UCB) value.  The results are said to be inconclusive if 
the F-test statistic falls between the upper and lower critical bound. Lastly, the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration is accepted if the F-statistic is below the lower critical bound. If long run 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality is found then we estimate the 
long run coefficients. The following model will be use to estimate the long run coefficients: 
 
 
 
If we find evidence of long run relationship between military expenditure and income inequality 
then we estimate the short run coefficients by employing the following model: 
 
 
 
The error correction model shows the speed of adjustment needed to restore the long run 
equilibrium following a short run shock. The  is the coefficient of error correction term in the 
model that indicates the speed of adjustment.  
 
3.3. Granger Causality Analysis 
The direction of causality between dependent and independent variables is firstly analyzed by 
Granger, (1969) causality test. The researcher performed the causality analysis of income 
inequality model on lag one. Jones, (1989) favors the ad-hoc selection method for lag length in 
Granger causality test over some of other statistical method to determine optimal lag. The 
equation of Granger causality model is given below: 
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It is assumed that  and  are uncorrelated. There are two variables which dealt with bilateral 
causality. Above equation states that  is related to its lag values and  is related to its lag 
values. 
 
3.4. Toda and Yamamoto Modified Wald Test Causality Analysis 
The direction of causality between dependent and independent variables is also analyzed by 
using the causality test based on Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure. This test use a modified 
Wald (MWALD) test which can be applied irrespective of whether underlying variables are 
purely I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) augmented Granger 
causality test uses the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique through estimating a 
two equation system. The Wald test improves efficiency when SUR models are used in the 
estimation. So, the model can be specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Where k is the optimal lag order, d is the maximum order of integration of the series in the 
system, and  and  are error terms that are assumed to be white noise. Usual Wald tests are 
then applied to the first k coefficient matrices using the standard χ2 – statistics.  
 
4. Estimations and Results 
To check the stationary properties, we use Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip Perron 
(PP) unit root tests. Table-3 represents the results of stationary tests. First, these tests are applied 
on level of variables then on their first difference. 
 
Table -3: Stationary Test Results 
Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
C C&T C C&T C C&T C C&T 
IIQ -2.17 -2.51 -3.90 -3.82 -1.52 -1.72 -4.00 -3.94 
MEX -2.36 -2.96 -4.46 -4.58 -2.04 -2.88 -4.48 -4.58 
GDP  1.95 -0.66 -3.75 -3.57 1.26 -0.26 -3.75 -3.59 
PCI 0.38 -1.67 -3.71 -3.71 0.03 -1.58 -3.72 -3.71 
Note: The critical values for ADF and PP tests with constant (c) and with constant & trend (C&T) 
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance are -3.711, -2.981, -2.629 and -4.394, -3.612, -3.243 
respectively. 
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Results of Table-3 show that all variables are stationary and integrated at first difference. This 
implies that the series of variables may exhibit a valid long run relationship. The Autoregressive 
distributed lag method for cointegration is used to estimate the long run relationship between 
military expenditures and income inequality. The first step is to determine the optimal lag length 
of the variables. The order of optimal lag length is decided by using the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion. Table-4 shows the results of the ARDL cointegration method.  
 
Table-4: Lag Length Selection & Bound Testing for Cointegration 
Lags Order AIC HQ SBC F-test Statistics 
0 0.925 0.986 1.108 
33.256* 1 -12.061 -11.757 -11.145 
2  -13.656*  -13.110*  -12.007* 
Note: * 1% level of significant.  
The ARDL results suggest the rejection of null hypothesis of no cointegration in model because 
the value of the F-statistic is greater than upper bound critical value at 1% level of significance 
in favor of alternative hypothesis that the valid long run relationship is existed between military 
spending and income inequality. Now the lag length order of all variables is estimated through 
unrestricted vector auto regression method. The decision criterion is based on minimum value of 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
10
.  
 
Table -6: Long Run Results using ARDL Approach 
Variables Coeff. t-stats Prob. 
Constant -0.226 -0.666 0.512 
IIQ (-1) 0.868 6.537 0.000 
MEX 0.139 2.369 0.027 
MEX (-1) -0.148 -1.862 0.076 
GDP  -0.067 -3.060 0.005 
GDP (-1) -0.097 -1.713 0.099 
GDP (-2) -0.003 -0.516 0.610 
PCI -0.359 -2.109 0.045 
PCI (-1) -0.097 -0.752 0.460 
PCI (-2) 0.001 0.170 0.867 
Adj. R
2
 0.888 
D.W stats 1.729 
F-stats (Prob.) 119.286 (0.000) 
 
Table-6 shows the results of long run ARDL estimations. The results of GDP and PCI are having 
expected negative and significant relationship with income inequality. We find that both 
                                                        
10 Table-5 represents the results of lag length order of all variables. The results of Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
indicate that the variables of income inequality and military expenditures should be included in model at 1
st
 lag 
while gross domestic product and per capita income should be included in model at 2
nd
 lag.  
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economic growth and increasing income level are the two major sources to reduce income 
inequality in Pakistan. The results indicate the positive and significant effect of military 
expenditures on income inequality. The coefficient of military expenditures is showing that a 1% 
increase in military expenditures cause to increase in income inequality by 0.139%. It is 
concluded that military expenditures is an important factor to deteriorate income inequality. The 
finding is consistent with the earlier available literature which is mostly showing the positive 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality.  
 
Table-7: Short Run Results using ARDL Approach 
Variables Coeff. t-stats Prob. 
Constant -0.340 -1.306 0.204 
∆IIQ (-1) 0.238 3.136 0.004 
∆MEX 0.122 3.633 0.001 
∆MEX (-1) -0.104 -0.303 0.764 
∆GDP  -0.337 -3.091 0.005 
∆GDP (-1) -0.011 -0.309 0.760 
∆GDP (-2) 0.009 1.073 0.294 
∆PCI -0.245 -2.104 0.046 
∆PCI (-1) -0.166 -0.186 0.854 
∆PCI (-2) 0.143 0.407 0.407 
ECM(-1) -0.096 -3.819 0.001 
Adj. R
2
 0.670 
D.W stats 1.699 
F-stats (Prob.) 94.167 (0.000) 
 
Table-7 represents the short run relationship between military spending and income inequality. 
The results indicate the lagged error correction term for the estimated income inequality equation 
which is negative and statistically significant. This confirms a valid short run relationship 
between military expenditures and income inequality. The coefficient of error term is showing 
the value of -0.096 that suggests about 10 % of disequilibrium which is corrected in current year. 
Interestingly, results indicate the positive and significant effect of military expenditures on 
income inequality.  
 
Stability of Long run Model: A Rolling Window Analysis 
The stability of coefficients of the long run model in the sample size is evaluated by using the 
rolling window estimation method. Figure-1 and Table-8 represent the coefficients of each year 
of military expenditure throughout the sample by using the rolling window estimation method. 
Two standard deviation bands show the upper and lower bounds.  
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Figure-1 Coefficient of MEX and its two S.E. bands based on rolling OLS (Dependent Variable: IIQ) 
 
Table-8: Long run Coefficients of Military Expenditures 
Year Coeff. Year Coeff. 
1991 0.267 2002 0.895 
1992 0.236 2003 0.224 
1993 0.162 2004 -0.260 
1994 0.114 2005 -0.270 
1995 -0.078 2006 -0.219 
1996 -0.175 2007 -0.019 
1997 -0.301 2008 0.168 
1998 -0.217 2009 0.277 
1999 -0.072 2010 0.271 
2000 0.725 2011 0.263 
2001 0.893 2012 0.175 
 
Our results verify that the military expenditures is having very mix coefficients throughout the 
sample period. The results of figure-1 and Table-8 show that the coefficient of military 
expenditures shows positive values from 1991 to 1994, 2000 to 2003 and 2008 to 2012. 
Conversely, the coefficient of military expenditures shows negative values from 1995 to 1999 
and 2004 to 2006.  From 2000 to 2002 the coefficient has increased significantly while from 
2003 to 2005 the coefficient has declined very sharply.  
 
The stability of short run model in the sample size is evaluated by using the cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and CUSUM of square test on the recursive residuals. The CUSUM test detects 
systematic changes from the coefficients of regression, while, CUSUM of square test is able to 
detect the sudden changes from constancy of regression coefficients [Brown et al. (1975)]. 
Figure-3 and 4 represent the results of CUSUM and CUSUM of square tests respectively. 
Results indicate that the statistics of both CUSUM and CUSUM of square test are located within 
13 
 
the interval bands at 5% confidence interval. Consequently, results suggest that there is no 
structural instability in the residuals of equation of income inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-2. Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% 
significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. The straight lines represent 
critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
The Causality Analysis 
In this section three different techniques of causality analysis namely, Granger causality 
analysis
11
, Toda and Yamamoto modified Wald test causality analysis
12
 and variance 
decomposition method
13
 have been used to analyze the robustness of causal relationship between 
military expenditures and income inequality in Pakistan. The results of Granger causality test are 
reported in Table-9. The results show the unidirectional causal relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality which runs from military expenditures to income inequality. 
                                                        
11 See, Granger (1969) 
12 See, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
13 The Variance Decomposition method is estimated through VAR framework, it shows the proportion contribution 
in one variable caused by the shocks in other variables, Pesaran and Shin (1998). 
-16
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The bidirectional causal relation exists between income per capita and income inequality. 
Economic growth Granger causes income inequality. 
 
Table-9: Results of Granger Causality Test 
Variables F-Statistic Probability 
IIQ does not Granger Cause MEX 0.210 0.650 
MEX does not Granger Cause IIQ 8.807 0.006 
IIQ does not Granger Cause GDP 0.017 0.898 
GDP does not Granger Cause IIQ 10.224 0.003 
IIQ does not Granger Cause PCI 6.071 0.020 
PCI does not Granger Cause IIQ 8.826 0.006 
Note: The lag length is 1.  
The results of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure based causality test are reported in Table-
10. We find that the unidirectional causal relationship between military expenditures and income 
inequality which runs from military expenditures to income inequality. Income inequality is also 
Granger cause of economic growth and income per capita. The results of Granger causality and 
Toda and Yamamoto Causality test are consistent. Both tests confirm that income inequality is 
Granger cause of military expenditures. 
 
Table-10: Results of Toda and Yamamoto Causality Test 
Dependent Variable 
Modified Wald – Statistics 
IIQ MEX GDP PCI 
IIQ _ 
13.294 6.404 7.534 
(0.001) (0.018) (0.011) 
MEX 
0.429 
_ 
2.102 2.416 
(0.518) (0.159) (0.132) 
Note: The lag length for IIQ is 1, MEX is 1, GDP is 2 and PCI is 2 as per Schwartz Bayesian Criteria 
(SBC). 
 
Variance Decomposition Approach 
Generalized forecast error variance decomposition method under vector autoregressive (VAR) 
system has also been used to analyze the strength of the causal relationship of military 
expenditures and income inequality. The variance decomposition method provides the magnitude 
of the predicted error variance for a series accounted for by innovations from each of the 
independent variable over different time period. Wong (2010), and Raza and Jawaid (2013) have 
used this approach to find causal relationship among considered variables. Table-11 represents 
the results of variance decomposition analysis. 
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Table-11: Results of Variance Decomposition Approach 
 Period IIQ MEX GDP PCI 
 Variance Decomposition of IIQ 
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 95.881 1.439 0.652 2.029 
3 82.431 1.454 10.475 5.641 
4 72.048 6.726 10.988 10.238 
5 58.152 14.572 12.442 14.835 
6 40.231 20.794 20.176 18.800 
7 31.201 24.352 22.639 21.808 
8 27.891 25.738 22.597 23.775 
9 26.433 25.699 23.052 24.817 
10 23.841 24.888 26.125 25.146 
  
   
  
 Variance Decomposition of MEX 
1 6.806 93.195 0.000 0.000 
2 4.186 94.412 0.251 1.150 
3 4.639 92.190 0.406 2.765 
4 1.398 94.312 0.322 3.968 
5 8.063 87.231 0.223 4.483 
6 5.746 89.446 0.191 4.618 
7 4.286 90.818 0.251 4.645 
8 3.366 91.585 0.394 4.655 
9 2.794 91.953 0.588 4.666 
10 2.466 92.051 0.799 4.684 
 
 
The results of Table-11 show that in the first round the change in income inequality is explained 
completely 100% by its own innovations. In the second period 95.88% explain by own 
innovation, 1.44% by military expenditure, 0.65% by gross domestic product and 2.03% by per 
capita income. In period five the shocks in income inequality explain 58.15% by own innovation, 
14.57% by innovations of military expenditures, 12.44% by innovations of gross domestic 
product and 14.84% by innovations of per capita income. In tenth period the shocks in income 
inequality explain 23.84% by own shocks, while, 24.89% explain by innovations of military 
expenditures, 26.13% explain by innovations of gross domestic product and 25.15% explain by 
innovations of per capita income. The shocks in military expenditures explain 93.20%, 94.41%, 
87.23% and 92.05% by its own innovations in period 1, 2, 5 and 10 respectively. The shocks in 
military expenditures explain 6.81%, 4.19%, 8.06% and 2.47% by innovation of income 
inequality in period 1, 2, 5 and 10 respectively. These findings also suggest the unidirectional 
causal relationship between military expenditures and income inequality which runs from 
military expenditures to income inequality.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The current study investigates the impact of military expenditures on income inequality in 
Pakistan by using the annual time series data for the period of 1972-2012. The ARDL bounds 
testing cointegration approach confirms the valid long run relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality. The results indicate that military expenditures have positive 
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relationship with the income inequality. The findings of CUSUM and CUSUM of square test 
suggest that there is no structural instability in the residuals of equation of income inequality. 
 
The results of rolling window estimation method indicate that the military expenditure is having 
very mix coefficients throughout the sample period. Our findings also indicate that the 
coefficient of military expenditures is showing positive from 1991 to 1994, 2000 to 2003 and 
2008 to 2012. Conversely, the coefficient of military expenditures is showing negative values 
from 1995 to 1999 and 2004 to 2006. The Granger causality, Toda and Yamamoto Modified 
Wald causality and variance decomposition analysis confirm the unidirectional causal 
relationship between military expenditures and income inequality which runs from military 
expenditure to income inequality in Pakistan.  
 
The findings of this study suggested that military expenditures would be a significant policy 
option to control the income inequality and should be considered as a mean to improving income 
distribution in Pakistan. Policy makers should critically analyze the reasons of negative 
association of military expenditures with income inequality in years from 1995 to 1999 and from 
2004 to 2006 to formulate favorable policies to improve income distribution in Pakistan. Policy 
makers should focus on diversifying their budget expenditures on more developing, social and 
welfare expenditures instead of high military expenditure to enhance the living standard and 
decrease the income inequality in Pakistan. 
 
At this stage it can be suggested that the mutual relationship between Pakistan and India is very 
important for the global peace and especially for South Asian region. Therefore, it is highly 
demanded that both Pakistan and India should initiate bilateral talks to develop mutual consensus 
to fight against income inequality, poverty and terrorism instead of fighting with each other. The 
economic condition and standard of living of both countries do not permit them to invest such a 
huge amount of their annual budgets on their defence spending. It is highly recommended that 
both countries should start dialogues to build a consensus for the peace by reducing their military 
budgets. This step may reduce the arm race in between Pakistan and India which will shift the 
huge chunk of their budget expenditures on more developing, social and welfare expenditures 
instead of high military expenditures to enhance the living standard and decrease the income 
inequality in Pakistan.  
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